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The Once and (Maybe) Future Klein
Principle
William D. Araiza*
Abstract
This Response considers Evan Zoldan’s argument, set forth in
his recently-published Article, that one can find a coherent
principle underlying the vexing case of United States v. Klein in
the idea that government is prohibited from what Zoldan calls
“self-dealing.” The promise is a seductive one: Klein, and in
particular its language prohibiting Congress from dictating “rules
of decision” to courts, has puzzled scholars for generations. As
Zoldan explains, other understandings of Klein all encounter
significant obstacles in the form of precedent that rebut other
explanations of what that case really means.
Unfortunately, Zoldan’s valiant and careful effort encounters
serious difficulties of its own. His self-dealing prohibition
arguably conflicts with an early post-Klein case, Eslin v. District
of Columbia, and conflicts even more seriously with the Court’s
most recent case to consider Klein, Patchak v. Zinke, which was
decided after Zoldan published his article. There is also reason to
question the practical workability and conceptual coherence of the
self-dealing prohibition Zoldan offers.
But Patchak also offers hope for those, like Zoldan, who see
worth in the possible normative values implicit in Klein. Patchak
featured a not-insignificant line-up of justices who expressed
sympathy with a meaningful reading of Klein as a limit on
Congress’s power to legislate in hyper-specific ways and ways that
leave no role for judicial analysis. Ironically, then, while Patchak
calls into serious question Zoldan’s solution to the Klein puzzle, it
also offers hope that the Court might eventually embrace a more
meaningful Klein principle.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to the editors of the
Washington & Lee Law Review for the invitation to publish this Response.
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Evan Zoldan has written important work on the
constitutional principle of legislative generality and on
constitutional limits on the form legislation takes.1 In the work
this Response addresses,2 he has (again)3 engaged the Great
While Whale of federal courts scholarship—the vexing case of
United States v. Klein4—through a similar lens. He has argued
that the principle of legislative generality, and in particular its
opposition not just to singling out, but to singling out that favors
the government, provides the best way to understand Klein. He
describes this as a principle prohibiting government
“self-dealing.” There is a great deal to admire in this effort.
Zoldan is right that legislative generality is—or at least, should
be—“a principle of constitutional dimension.”5 In addition, Zoldan
has done very careful analysis of Klein in his attempt to craft a
doctrinal rule that is both workable and still consistent with at
least most of extant precedent.6
But the attempt falters. As this Response suggests, the
self-dealing principle that Zoldan offers is likely a very difficult
1. See generally Evan C. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component of
Legislative Generality, 51 RICH. L. REV. 489 (2017); Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving
Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625 (2014).
2. Evan Zoldan, The Klein Rule of Decision Puzzle and the Self-Dealing
Solution, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2133 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, The Klein
Rule].
3. See generally Evan C. Zoldan, Bank Markazi and the Undervaluation of
Legislative Generality, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 1 (2016).
4. 80 U.S. 129 (1871).
5. Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2152.
6. Zoldan recognizes that his proffered reading of Klein stands in at least
some tension with one important post-Klein precedent. See infra note 60 and
accompanying text.
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one to apply in any principled way—not just as a matter of courts
being able to discern when self-dealing lurks in a given
government action, but also as a more conceptual matter of
understanding self-dealing emanating from a sovereign.
Moreover, the Court’s most recent engagement with Klein—its
February 2018 decision in Patchak v. Zinke7—raises questions
about the viability of Zoldan’s self-dealing reading of Klein. There
is good reason to be disheartened by the result in Patchak. But it
also provides reason for hope, given that the prevailing side was
fractured, that one of the six votes on that side remains
sympathetic to a stronger reading of Klein,8 and that the newest
Justice, Justice Gorsuch, voted with the dissent.9 These
developments suggest that the struggle to craft a meaningful
understanding of Klein is not over. But, paradoxically, they also
suggest that that understanding may ultimately come to rest on
considerations different from those offered by Zoldan in his
excellent and careful analysis. After Part I sets forth the
challenge Klein poses, Part II examines Zoldan’s self-dealing
principle and its difficulties. Part III concludes by briefly
discussing Patchak and the potential it carries for a meaningful
understanding of Klein.
I. The Puzzle of Klein
Klein is a deeply puzzling case. To summarize the facts,10
after the Civil War, Klein, the executor of the estate of a former
confederate named Wilson, sued the federal government to
recover the proceeds of the sale of Wilson’s cotton that Union
forces confiscated during the war. Wilson, who had taken an oath
of loyalty to the Union, had been pardoned by the President, and
thus was considered a loyal citizen based on a Supreme Court
decision that had interpreted presidential pardons as cleansing
any taint of treason from those accepting them.11 Klein thus sued
7. 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
8. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
9. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 914.
10. For a fuller statement of Klein’s facts, see Zoldan, The Klein Rule,
supra note 2, at 2144–46.
11. See generally United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531 (1870) (construing
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under a Civil War-era law that both authorized seizure of enemy
property but also guaranteed the property rights of loyal citizens,
a group that included Wilson, based on the effect of the pardon as
understood by the Court.12
While Klein’s suit was pending in the federal courts,
Congress enacted a law that denied recovery for persons in
Wilson’s position.13 That law required courts to interpret a
person’s receipt of a presidential pardon as evidence of disloyalty,
unless the person’s acceptance of the pardon was accompanied by
a denial of the underlying charge.14 It further specified that when
a plaintiff relied on such a pardon as support for his
compensation claim, the court should dismiss the cause “for want
of jurisdiction.”15
In Klein, the Court struck that law down.16 After providing
an extended discussion of the history of presidential pardon offers
extended during and immediately after the Civil War,17 and
explaining the constitutional status of the Court of Claims (where
Klein originally brought the suit),18 the Court moved directly into
its famous language prohibiting Congress from “prescrib[ing] a
rule for the decision of a cause in a particular case.”19 After a two
page discussion of that issue,20 the Court then observed, almost
as an afterthought, that “[t]he rule prescribed is also liable to just
exception as impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing
the constitutional power of the Executive.”21 Thus, the Court very
strongly suggested that its discussion of the “rule of decision”
issue, while surely connected to the constitutional status of a
pardon, pointed to a problem with the statute separate and
the effect of a presidential pardon).
12. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 129, 148 (1871).
13. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 1, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 147 (“We must think that Congress has
inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power.”).
17. Id. at 139–42.
18. Id. at 144–45.
19. Id. at 146.
20. Id. at 146–47.
21. Id. at 147.
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distinct from its attack on the executive branch—that is, the
Court suggested that the statute also had the effect of
unconstitutionally interfering with the judicial power.22
It is the statute’s latter, Article III-based infirmity that has
puzzled scholars ever since. On its face, the idea that Congress
acts unconstitutionally when it “prescribe[s] rules of decision”23
seems to collide with the reality that any legislation effectively
does exactly that.24 Scholars have attempted to square this
reality with Klein’s statements by focusing on several aspects of
legislation that might render it problematic: most notably, a law’s
retroactivity, hyper-narrowness, reference to particular cases
whose results the law intends to affect, or positive impact on the
government’s litigating position in a case involving the
government. As Zoldan carefully explains, all of these
explanations for Klein, as well as others that he offers, come up
short, either as a matter of logic or precedent.25
II. The Self-Dealing Theory
Zoldan offers another explanation for Klein. He argues that
Klein and cases that have engaged it can be understood as
reflecting a rule against government “self-dealing.”26 As Zoldan
explains it, under this principle “when a statute is drawn
narrowly to benefit the government in a particular set of cases, or
22. Justice Miller’s dissent also described its holding in terms of Congress’s
asserted attempt to prescribe to the judiciary the effect of a presidential pardon.
Id. at 148 (Miller, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 146.
24. See generally, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson:
Equal Protection, The Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory
Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1079 (1999).
25. See generally Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2 at 2148–73. That
precedent includes Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S.Ct. 1310 (2016). In Bank
Markazi, the Court upheld a statute that made available the assets of the
Iranian state bank to satisfy judgments finding the Iranian Government
responsible for acts of terrorism. Id. at 1317. A seven-justice majority cast doubt
on the bank’s argument that hyper-specific legislation is inherently problematic,
and rejected the argument that the statute left nothing for courts to decide and
thus dictated a result. Id. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Sotomayor,
dissented. Id. at 1329.
26. See, e.g., Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2193 (referring to
what Zoldan calls “the Klein Self-Dealing Principle”).
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necessarily will run to the advantage of the government in all
situations, a statute self-deals within the meaning of this
principle.”27 He cautions, however, that the kind of self-dealing he
views as condemned by Klein does not include such laws that
benefit the government when that benefit is designed to
“accomplish . . . a broader governmental objective.”28 Zoldan
argues that this principle explains both Klein29 and “most rule of
decision cases.”30
Zoldan’s self-dealing principle is an attractive one. As he
notes, it reflects a broader jurisprudential commitment to
government neutrality—in this case, a prohibition on government
skewing the scales of justice by using its lawmaking power to
force a decision in its favor in a case that implicates the
government not as a policy-maker but simply as an interested
litigator, no more deserving than any other litigator to fix the
rules by which its liability is determined.31 It also reflects, if
indirectly, Zoldan’s focus on legislative generality—that is, the
disfavor with which constitutional law looks, or should look, on
government action that precisely targets one winner and one
loser. Indeed, his self-dealing principle targets the most egregious
form of such singling out—singling out that benefits the
government itself, for no public purpose. Nevertheless, that
principle, like all principles that have been offered to explain
Klein, encounters difficulties.
A. Self-Dealing as Applied to Klein
First, consider Klein itself. Zoldan concludes that the statute
in Klein violates the self-dealing principle because it always
benefits the government, and only the government. Importantly,
he writes that that law “did not establish a broader governmental
policy within the meaning of [the] self-dealing principle.”32 But
it’s not clear what Zoldan means by that statement. At the end of
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 2190.
Id. at 2193–94.
Id. at 2194–96.
Id. at 2197; see also id. at 2197–2216.
Id. at 2174–79.
Id. at 2196.
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the Article, he offers a series of examples of laws that implicate
that principle, all dealing with an environmental protection law
to which Congress legislates a set of different exemptions relating
to the operation of power plants. He identifies one such
exemption—exempting from the law a particular plant
constructed and operated by the federal government and
identified in the law33—as most likely to violate Klein. According
to Zoldan, this is because that exemption reflects no general
policy addressing power generation; rather, it simply decrees that
the environmental impairment the original law seeks to prevent
is not implicated by the particular facility identified in the
statute.34
But it’s not clear why laws such as his hypothetical power
plant exemption should be thought of as not “establish[ing] a
broader governmental policy,” unless, by definition, governmental
policy cannot be “establish[ed]” in a targeted way. For example, it
would presumably be perfectly coherent for government to
conclude that a particular power station is a crucial part of the
national or local power infrastructure, such that ensuring its
continued existence reflects perfectly sound policy—and, more
relevantly for our purposes, “policy” of any sort.35 To be sure, at
other points in his analysis Zoldan seems to suggest that
legislation that otherwise appears to be self-dealing is not so if
the benefits it confers only on the government inure to the public
more generally.36 Nevertheless, Zoldan’s suggestion that this
33. The hypothetical law in question accomplishes this exception in a
manner calling to mind the statute in Robertson, that is, by referring to the
structure identified in the lawsuit the statute seeks to end.
34. See Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2223–25; see also
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (upholding a law that
“determined and directed” that new obligations imposed on the federal
government satisfied the obligations imposed by the statutes identified in two
particular federal court cases identified by names and case numbers).
35. Cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 129, 146–47 (1871) (distinguishing
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855),
which upheld a law identifying a particular bridge as a post road and nullified
its previous status as a nuisance, on the ground that the law simply created a
new state of affairs that would be applied to any relevant future case).
36. See Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2192–93 (“[I]f the change
in law abrogates an obligation of the government only incidental to the
accomplishment of a broader governmental objective, or benefits someone other
than the government, then it amends applicable law and must be applied by the
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targeted exemption would likely fail his self-dealing principle
presumably means that that exemption does not establish policy,
as Zoldan uses that term. This result would suggest that a great
deal of government decision-making would become subject to
judicial invalidation. But even the self-dealing inquiry itself, so
understood, would raise concerns, to the extent it would require
courts to determine whether such a particularized exemption
does in fact establish broader public policy. One would think that
courts performing such an inquiry would need to exhibit some
measure of deference to the government’s argument that the
challenged law, despite its narrowness, did in fact legitimately
establish policy for the public benefit. Of course, such deference,
if applied liberally, might effectively validate self-dealing.37
Zoldan’s application of this principle to Klein itself raises this
issue. To be sure, the law in Klein was not the sort of
narrowly-targeted law that he hypothesizes toward the end of the
Article. After all, the statute in Klein applied to everyone in
Wilson’s position. But for Zoldan, the Klein law nevertheless
failed the self-dealing test, because “whatever the motivations of
Congress for doing so, the effect of the proviso [at issue in Klein]
was only to relieve the government of its obligations under the
[law allowing loyal southerners to recover their property], not to
set public policy.”38 But this is just an assertion. It is just as
reasonable to assert that the effect of that proviso was to prevent
overly-generous pardoning action by the President, and
overly-generous judicial interpretations of such pardons, from
inappropriately lightening the burdens to be borne by people who
were factually disloyal to the Union during the war. Of course,
such a policy might be beyond Congress’s power to enact, since
that policy might interfere with either the President’s pardoning
power and/or the courts’ power to construe the effects of pardons.
But that is a different rationale for striking the proviso down.
Indeed, it’s the rationale that all scholars of Klein take as
relatively unexceptional. The rationale that Zoldan cares about—
court.”).
37. Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (employing highly
deferential review to uphold against equal protection and due process challenges
a law that might well have been motivated by private party rent-seeking).
38. Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2196.
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the prohibition on legislative prescriptions of “rules of decision”—
is explained by Zoldan’s self-dealing rationale only if one is
willing to take a narrow view of what counts as legitimate public
policy, and, by extension, only if one is willing to take a very
broad view of courts’ power to second-guess the assertion that
such laws do indeed promote some public good.
B. Self-Dealing In Post-Klein Cases
1. The Easy Cases
Zoldan divides the most important cases engaging Klein into
several categories.39 The first category, which he discusses only
briefly,40 involves cases where the government has legislated to
favor one private party over another private party, rather than
the government as litigator over its litigation adversary. Zoldan
considers these easy cases for his self-dealing principle. And they
are, for the obvious reason the government can be presumed not
to gain a direct benefit from a ruling in favor of one private party
as opposed to the other.41
The second category of cases involves the government as a
party, but features legislation that favors the private party in the
case. He includes in this category the venerable case The
Schooner Peggy,42 in which the Supreme Court enforced the terms
of a treaty that required the return of a vessel previously claimed
as a prize, even though the treaty was concluded after the lower
court had ruled in favor of the vessel’s status as a prize (a status
that inured partially to the benefit of the United States). Nearly
two centuries later, in United States v. Sioux Nation,43 the Court
upheld a law that waived the federal government’s defense of res
judicata in litigation involving the government as a defendant. In
39. This Response does not address each case Zoldan discusses, but does
discuss each category. See generally Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at
2197–2216. One of the important cases Zoldan discusses, District of Columbia v.
Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901), is discussed later in this Response. Infra Part II.B.2.
40. Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2197–98.
41. Id. at 2198.
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
43. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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so doing, the Court distinguished Klein on the ground that the
statute in Sioux Nation operated to disadvantage the
government.44 These cases also are self-explanatory as
illustrations of Zoldan’s self-dealing principle.

2. The Harder Cases
But then harder cases arise. Zoldan begins with Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon Society,45 a 1992 case in which the Court
unanimously rejected a Klein-based challenge to the “Northwest
Timber Compromise,” (Compromise) a federal law that sought to
resolve a dispute between logging and environmental interests in
the Pacific Northwest. The dispute took the form of two lawsuits,
brought by, respectively, the Portland and Seattle chapters of the
National Audubon Society.46 Those lawsuits alleged that federal
management of old-growth forests in the Northwest violated
several federal laws, including the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and
the National Environmental Policy Act. While those suits were
pending, Congress brokered a compromise. That compromise
imposed new requirements on federal management of those
forests, but also “determine[d] and direct[ed]” that satisfaction of
those new requirements
is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the
statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated
cases captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale
Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and Washington Contract Loggers
Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order
granting preliminary injunction) and the case Portland
Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 871160-FR.47

44. Id. at 405; see also Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2200.
45. 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
46. See id. at 434 (quoting the federal statute that in turn identified the
lawsuits brought by both organizations).
47. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 745 (1989).
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A unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit held that this provision
prescribed a rule of decision, and thus violated Klein.48 As noted
above, a unanimous Supreme Court disagreed.49
As Zoldan acknowledges,50 Robertson presents a difficult
challenge for scholars seeking to explain Klein. On the one hand,
“determin[ing] and direct[ing]” that satisfaction of the
Compromise’s new requirements for federal land management is
“adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory
requirements” the plaintiffs cited in their lawsuits appears on its
face to force courts to reach certain results, a seemingly clear
violation of Klein’s rule of decision prohibition. On the other
hand, a moment’s reflection should lead one to the conclusion
ultimately reached by the Supreme Court, namely, that this
provision simply amended those underlying laws, to make them
inapplicable in the context of the lawsuits the provision
identified. Surely, this is not the most transparent way of making
law. But, according to the Supreme Court, it remains lawmaking.
But if that is true, then what remains of Klein’s rule of decision
prohibition?
Zoldan argues that the self-dealing principle explains
Robertson, in two ways.51 First, he observes that the Compromise
imposes real obligations on the government, and leaves open the
prospect of future litigation against the government if it defaults
on those obligations.52 Thus, this is not a situation like Klein
itself where, without having to do anything substantive, the
government necessarily wins as a result of the statute. Second, he
argues that the Compromise achieved a public purpose beyond
simply lifting a burden on the government.53 Rather, the
48. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
49. See Robertson, 503 U.S. at 437.
50. See Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2201 (“The difficult
Robertson decision has long been considered a significant challenge to the
articulation of a viable Klein principle.”).
51. Id. at 2201–07.
52. Id. at 2204–05.
53. Zoldan does concede that the Compromise likely lifted burdens on the
government, since the new requirements the Compromise imposed on the
government were less onerous than those in the laws that the Compromise
effectively partially repealed. See id. at 2205
Certainly, some part of the impact of the Compromise relieved the
government of an obligation; at the least, it was relieved of its
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Compromise successfully mediated the conflicting demands of
logging and environmental interests, and as such, established
effective government policy.
Zoldan’s analysis of Robertson is lawyerly and careful.
Nevertheless, it leaves unanswered important questions about
workability of his self-dealing principle. First, once one gets past
a statute that necessarily results in a complete victory for the
government, it becomes difficult to draw a coherent line
separating laws that unconstitutionally self-deal and those for
which the self-dealing aspect is only a part of the law’s effect.
Robertson illustrates this problem. Zoldan’s self-dealing principle
requires that a “substantial” part of the challenged law’s impact
consist not simply in lifting a burden from the government.54
Consider the difficulty this standard imposes on courts. For
example, what if, instead of imposing the requirements the
Compromise actually placed on the government, it instead
imposed a very rudimentary requirement—say, a requirement
that government simply keep records of the number of trees
harvested? One could argue that such a requirement, trivial as it
is, remains substantive: for example, one could suggest that such
record-keeping could spur future legislative efforts to protect the
forests, once the extent of the logging became clear. Would that
count as substantial enough an obligation to defeat the
self-dealing claim? How would a court decide?
Zoldan’s second explanation for the Compromise’s
constitutionality is even more susceptible to a critique based on
the difficulty of line-drawing, and, ultimately, on judicial
competence. Zoldan notes that the Compromise established public
policy rather than simply benefitting the government as a
litigant. But the assumption underlying this rule—that courts
are able to tell the difference between government policy-making
and government actions taken simply to benefit itself as a
litigator—may be difficult to vindicate. Consider a governmental
decision to cut off all lawsuits against it by asserting sovereign
obligation to litigate the cases referenced in the Compromise.
Further, to the extent that the obligations of (b)(3) and (b)(5) were
less onerous than the statutory obligations provided by generally
applicable environmental statutes, the government was relieved of
those burdens as well.
54. Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2193.
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immunity, or even simply sovereign immunity to suits seeking
damages or other retrospective relief. The Court has
acknowledged, most notably in its state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence, that government immunity from lawsuits or at
least from certain types of relief provide important public
benefits.55 If such assertions of sovereign immunity can be
defended on public policy grounds then, again, how can courts
competently draw a line separating laws whose predominant
effect is simply to benefit the government as a litigator, and those
that feature a greater proportion of public policy benefits relative
to those self-dealing benefits? This latter critique repeats this
Response’s questions about how the self-dealing principle would
apply to Klein itself.56 That same critique applies here—as,
indeed, it would to any application of the policy-making exception
to the self-dealing prohibition.
Finally, Zoldan considers District of Columbia v. Eslin.57 In
Eslin the Court upheld a statute that vacated creditors’
judgments against the District of Columbia government. That
statute repealed an earlier federal law that had both made the
federal government liable for the District’s debts and allowed
creditors of the District’s public works board to renew lawsuits
that had previously been dismissed. An important part of this
convoluted story is that, at the time, the D.C. government was
not a federal entity.58 This oddity allows Zoldan to read to its
fullest extent Eslin’s language that the federal government’s
initial shouldering of the District’s debt liabilities constituted an
act of grace, which Congress was thus free to abandon without
constitutional consequence.59
Zoldan acknowledges that this reading of Eslin “is not free of
difficulty.”60 As he explains, one could argue that the federal
55. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751–52 (1999) (noting the
accountability benefits state governments enjoy when they are able to avoid
lawsuits seeking retrospective relief).
56. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
57. District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901).
58. See Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2213 (“When the District
became indebted for the work that was the subject of Eslin’s claims, the District
was, for relevant purposes, not the United States government.”).
59. Id. at 2213–15.
60. Id. at 2214.
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government in Eslin had shouldered the same obligation to pay
the District’s debts as it had shouldered in Klein after the
Supreme Court decided that a pardon did in fact erase the label
“disloyal” that previously would have disqualified Wilson’s estate
from seeking reimbursement for his seized cotton.61 Nevertheless,
he concludes that this reading is the best way to harmonize Klein
and Eslin,62 the latter case, as he notes, not even bothering to cite
Klein.63
The space limitations of this Response preclude a deep
engagement with Zoldan’s reading of Eslin, which, at any rate, is
tangential to the underlying question of the self-dealing
principle’s viability. For that narrower purpose, Zoldan’s reading
of Eslin is important because it forces us to consider the
distinction between government obligation and government
grace, and whether that distinction provides a stable foundation
for a general principle prohibiting self-dealing. The next Part
takes up this work, albeit briefly.
III. Patchak and the Possibility of Another Reading of Klein
In Patchak v. Zinke,64 decided after the publication of
Zoldan’s Article, the Court returned, for the second time in as
many years,65 to the question of Klein’s meaning. In Patchak, a
sharply divided Court upheld a federal law governing legal claims
relating to a parcel of land that the Secretary of the Interior took
into trust for the benefit of a Native tribe that desired the land
for a casino.66 After a neighboring landowner’s lawsuit
challenging the Secretary’s decision enjoyed preliminary
success,67 Congress enacted the law in question. Section 2(a) of
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2172.
64. 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
65. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S.Ct. 1310 (2016). Zoldan mentions
Bank Markazi at several points in his analysis, most importantly to note how
that case makes doubtful a straightforward reading of Klein as barring
hyper-specific legislation. See generally Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at
2173.
66. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 901.
67. See generally Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi
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that law—unchallenged in Patchak—“ratified and confirmed” the
Secretary’s decision to take the land into trust. Section 2(b)—the
provision at issue in Patchak—reads as follows:
NO CLAIMS.— Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of
the date of enactment of this Act) relating to the land
described in subsection (a) shall not be filed or maintained in a
Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.68

A six-justice majority upheld this law. Writing for four of
those justices, Justice Thomas concluded that Section 2(b)
constituted a stripping of federal court jurisdiction over claims
such as Patchak’s, and that such jurisdiction stripping was a
valid use of Congress’s power to set the jurisdiction of federal
courts. He acknowledged that the Constitution prevents Congress
from “compel[ling] . . . findings or results under old law,”69 but he
concluded that Section 2(b)’s jurisdiction stripping changed the
law, and did so for “an open-ended class of disputes.”70
Justice Breyer concurred, concluding that Section 2(b) was
simply a housekeeping measure that ensured the effectiveness of
Section 2(a)’s confirmation of the parcel’s status as trust land.71
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concurred only in
the judgment. She concluded that Section 2(b) should be
construed as the government’s reassertion of the sovereign
immunity it had waived when it enacted the Administrative
Procedure Act, the statute under which Patchak sued.72
Importantly, Justice Sotomayor wrote her own concurrence in the
judgment, to reiterate her agreement with Justice Ginsburg’s
sovereign immunity conclusion, but also to stress her agreement
with much of the dissent’s analysis.73

Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012) (holding that the federal government
had waived its sovereign immunity to the lawsuit and that the plaintiff had
standing to sue).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
69. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 901 (internal quotation omitted).
70. Id. at 910 (internal quotation omitted).
71. Id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 912 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 913 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Gorsuch, dissented.74 Disputing the characterizations of Section
2(b) as either a jurisdiction-stripping statute75 or an assertion of
sovereign immunity,76 he insisted that that provision left nothing
for courts to decide and thus did not establish a new legal rule.
He also insisted that Section 2(b) compelled a result in a single
case, given the expiration of the limitations period on any
possible future challenges to the trust status of the property.
Indeed, even assuming that Section 2(b) was properly understood
as a jurisdiction-stripping provision, he still argued that it
violated the Constitution by compelling a result in one and only
one case, thus violating his belief that “the concept of ‘changing
the law’ must imply some measure of generality or preservation
of an adjudicative role for the courts.”77
The Court’s decision in Patchak illustrates both the limits of
Klein today but also the potential for a meaningful Klein rule in
the future. First, Patchak is difficult to square with any
self-dealing limitation on congressional power. The hard fact of
the matter is that in Patchak a majority allowed Congress to
ensure that the federal government would prevail in any
challenge to its decision taking into trust the property in
question. Indeed, regardless of its characterization as a
jurisdiction stripping provision or a reassertion of federal
sovereign immunity, Section 2(b) ensured that any such challenge
could not even be heard on the merits. This result conflicts with
Zoldan’s self-dealing principle, unless that principle allows for
such avoidance on the theory that the federal sovereign’s
amenability to suit is purely a matter of grace. In that latter case,
the self-dealing principle leaves open a major loophole, given that
either such characterization of a law would constitute a highly
attractive vehicle for government to accomplish exactly what
Zoldan urges it should be prohibited from accomplishing.
Nevertheless, and perhaps ironically, the voting in Patchak
raises hope that the justices may yet possess some appetite for a
meaningful understanding of Klein. First, Chief Justice Roberts’
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 913 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 919–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 922 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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dissent garnered two new adherents that he did not have in his
Bank Markazi dissent. To be sure, he lost his only supporter from
Bank Markazi—Justice Sotomayor—but the fact that in Patchak
she agreed with much of his reasoning suggests that her vote is
eminently gettable. Just as heartening is the fact that Chief
Justice Roberts’ Patchak dissent was a full-throated insistence on
legislative generality and a realistically meaningful judicial role
in applying statutes. The fact that that insistence gained the
votes of two other justices, and the sympathy of a third, suggests
that the Court is in fact closely split on the possibility of
resurrecting a meaningful Klein principle, just as the last
remaining plausible Article III-based reading of Klein—
Zoldan’s—appears less and less viable as a matter of existing
precedent.

